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We study the implications of financial hedging for corporate cash policy and the value
of cash holdings. Using a web crawler program to collect data on the use of financial
derivatives between 1993 and 2016, we find that US public firms with financial hedging
programs have smaller cash reserves but a higher value of cash than firms without hedg-
ing contracts in place. Our empirical results are robust when controlling for potential
endogeneity issues, corporate governance, cash regimes and alternative measures of cash
holdings. Further, we find that financial hedging not only increases the investment sensi-
tivity to internal cash, but also has a positive effect on investment efficiency. The positive
effect of financial hedging on the value of cash is more pronounced for firms with more
financial constraints, higher information asymmetry and weaker corporate governance.
Collectively, our paper highlights the importance of corporate cash policy as a channel
through which financial risk management increases firm value.
Introduction
In the presence of asymmetric information, exter-
nal borrowing is more costly than using internally
generated funds, and firms are more likely to
reserve cash to meet the need for future invest-
ment expenditures (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
Cash holdings can also alleviate underinvestment
for firms with tighter financial constraints and
greater growth opportunities (Kim, Mauer and
Sherman, 1998). As a result, firms may hold cash
to hedge for the risk of future cash shortfalls due
to the precautionary motive. Meanwhile, previous
financial hedging studies suggest that firms with
financial hedging programs have lower cash flow
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volatility, lower external financing costs, greater
debt capacity and fewer investment restrictions
(e.g. Campello et al., 2011; Chen and King, 2014;
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Smith and
Stulz, 1985). Taken together, the use of finan-
cial derivatives should increase firms’ flexibility
to finance future investment opportunities and
reduce their precautionary motive for holding
cash. We posit that firms with financial hedging
programs have smaller cash reserves than firms
without such programs. Furthermore, financial
hedging may also increase firm value through
enhancing firms’ efficiency in using cash. Recent
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) studies show
that compared to non-users, derivatives users are
more likely to choose the cash payment method
in domestic M&A deals (Alexandridis, Chen and
Zeng, 2021) and experience higher cross-border
M&A deal announcement returns (Chen, Han
and Zeng, 2017). We conjecture that the impact
of financial hedging on corporate cash policy is
positively valued by shareholders, and thus firms
with financial hedging programs have a higher
value of cash than firms without such programs.
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Due to sample limitations, previous hedging
studies do not draw a conclusion on the relation
between derivatives use and cash holdings. Based
on hand-collected hedging data, Opler et al. (1999)
show that the intensity of derivatives use is posi-
tively related to corporate cash holdings among a
sample of S&P 500 firms in 1994, while Haushal-
ter, Klasa andMaxwell (2007) find that derivatives
use is negatively related to corporate cash holdings
among a sample of S&P 500 manufacturing firms
during 1993–1997. To resolve the inconsistent
findings in these two papers, we develop a web
crawler program to automatically capture the use
of financial derivatives from US firms’ annual
financial statements between 1993 and 2016. Our
textual analysis of US firms’ 10-K filings results
in a sample of 62,859 firm-year observations for
8,235 unique firms. In our sample, 59.5% of firms
use at least one type of interest rate (IR) or foreign
exchange (FX) derivatives, and 64.3% of firms
use at least one type of IR, FX or commodity
(COMMD) derivatives.
After controlling for firm characteristics and
both the year and industry fixed effects, we show
that firms with financial hedging programs have
smaller cash reserves. Given that the average cash
reserve in our sample is 19.4% of total assets, the
difference in the cash to total assets ratio between
derivatives users and non-users is about 3.1–3.6%
of an average firm’s cash holdings. We then ex-
plore the value implication of financial hedging on
corporate cash holdings by extending Faulkender
and Wang’s (2006) framework, which estimates
the market value of one additional dollar in cash
holdings. We find strong evidence that the value
of corporate cash holdings is positively related to
financial hedging. The marginal value of cash is
$0.06 higher for derivatives users than non-users.
To address the potential endogeneity concerns
due to omitted variables, non-random selection
bias, reverse causality and measurement errors,
we employ three identification methods. First, we
adopt Heckman’s (1978) treatment effect model
and use the tax convexity estimated by Graham
and Smith (1999) as the identification variable
in the first-stage regressions. Second, we adopt
a propensity score matching (PSM) approach to
identify a group of control firms without financial
hedging programs, which are comparable to firms
with such programs. Third, we follow Gormley
and Matsa (2014) and employ a high-dimensional
fixed effects model to mitigate the potential endo-
geneity concern due to unobserved heterogeneity
across firms and time-varying heterogeneity across
industries. Our main results remain robust to these
three identification tests.
Next, we examine four plausible mechanisms
through which the use of financial derivatives
increases the value of cash. First, our analysis
indicates that financial hedging is associated with
improvements in investment efficiency, evidenced
by the increase in investment sensitivity to future
growth opportunities and internal cash. Second,
we show that the positive financial hedging effect
on the value of cash is stronger for financially
constrained firms. Financial hedging helps firms
with financial constraints to reduce their external
financing costs, and subsequently mitigate their
precautionary motive for holding cash. Therefore,
the market perceived value of cash for finan-
cially constrained firms increases with the use of
financial derivatives. Third, we find that the pos-
itive relation between financial hedging and the
value of cash is more pronounced for firms with
higher information asymmetry. Financial hedging
mitigates the information asymmetry between
managers and shareholders and reduces share-
holders’ monitoring costs, therefore managers
may increase the efficiency of internal cash use
within an environment with higher information
transparency. Fourth, we show that the positive
effect of financial hedging on the value of cash
is larger among firms with more severe ex-ante
agency problems, supporting the view that finan-
cial hedging mitigates potential agency conflict
between managers and shareholders.
In our industry-specific analyses, we find that
within each of the Fama–French 10 industries,
financial hedging still has a negative impact on
cash holdings except for the Telecommunications
industry, and a positive impact on the value of
cash except for the Consumer Durables, Telecom-
munications and Wholesale, Retail and Services
industries. Our results provide a full picture of the
role played by financial hedging in corporate cash
policy, which helps to reconcile the opposing views
of derivatives use in previous cash-holding studies.
In a set of sensitivity tests, we show that our main
results remain robust after controlling for cor-
porate governance, trifurcating our sample into
ex-post cash regimes, using alternative measures
of corporate cash holdings that are not essential
for corporate operations and investment, control-
ling for the persistent tone of financial statements
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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and lagging financial hedging variables by 1 or
2 years.
Our paper contributes to the literature in three
ways. First, we add to the broad literature on cor-
porate risk management by providing evidence on
the causal effect of derivatives use on cash hold-
ings. Most prior hedging studies either use a small
sample of firms (e.g. Géczy, Minton and Schrand,
1997; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Guay and
Kothari, 2003; Haushalter, 2000) or focus on a spe-
cific industry (e.g. Haushalter, Klasa andMaxwell,
2007; Jin and Jorion, 2006; Mackay and Moeller,
2007; Pérez-González and Yun, 2013; Tufano,
1996). To comprehensively understand the impact
of financial hedging on corporate cash holdings
and the value of cash, we adopt a textual analysis
of all US firms’ 10-K filings and provide a full pic-
ture of the role played by financial hedging in cor-
porate cash management. Second, our paper sheds
light on the roles of financial hedging in reducing
the precautionary demand for cash reserves and
improving the efficiency of corporate cash policy.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first
to show that financial hedging not only increases
the investment sensitivity to internal cash, but also
has a positive effect on investment efficiency. Our
paper is related to Campello et al. (2011), who find
a positive relation between derivatives use and cap-
ital expenditures. However, Campello et al. (2011)
do not tackle the overarching question of how fi-
nancial hedging affects the quality of investment
decisions. Finally, we contribute to the value-of-
cash literature by showing that corporate riskman-
agement is positively associated with the value of
cash, since derivatives use may mitigate financial
constraints, information asymmetry and agency
problems.
Related literature and hypotheses
A theoretical firm operating in an imperfect
capital market generates stochastic cash flows
from its existing assets and has uncertain future
investment opportunities. The firm cannot raise
sufficient funds in external capital markets to
finance its investments due to market frictions.
Alternatively, it can choose to save a portion of
today’s earnings as cash holdings. The benefit of
carrying cash is the firm’s flexibility to finance its
future investment opportunities, whilst the cost of
doing so is the opportunity cost of forgoing its in-
vestment opportunities with a positive net present
value (NPV) today. Duchin (2010) indicates that
the optimal level of corporate cash holdings is
determined by the joint distribution of investment
opportunities and cash flows over time. Previ-
ous studies propose that financial hedging may
influence corporate cash holdings through three
channels: cash flow uncertainty, risky investment
opportunity and financial risk.
Regarding the cash flow uncertainty channel,
Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) model the
positive relation between cash holding and cash
flow volatility. In addition, Bates, Kahle and Stulz
(2009) show that the dramatic increase inUS firms’
cash holdings from 1980 to 2006 can be attributed
to the precautionary motive for alleviating cash
flow risk instead of agency conflicts. It is generally
accepted that corporate financial risk manage-
ment may reduce future cash flow volatility and
the likelihood of negative future cash flows (Froot,
Scharfstein and Stein, 1993). Therefore, deriva-
tives users have a lower precautionary motive than
non-users to hold cash today. As for the risky
investment opportunity channel, Leland (1998)
shows that financial hedging increases a firm’s
external financing capacity. Campello et al. (2011)
also find that, compared to non-users, derivatives
users pay lower interest spreads on their bank
loans and are less likely to have capital expenditure
covenants in their loan agreements. Carter, Rogers
and Simkins (2006) show that airlines with a desire
for expansion may hedge future purchases of jet
fuel with financial derivatives, since investment
opportunities in the airline industry are positively
related to jet fuel costs and higher fuel costs are
associated with lower cash flow. With greater debt
capacity, lower external financing costs and fewer
investment restrictions, derivatives users havemore
flexibility to finance their future investment oppor-
tunities, and have less incentive to hold cash today.
Besides the above two channels, Harford and
Uysal (2014) document a financial risk channel
that firms mitigate the increase in their debt re-
financing risk by holding more cash due to the
shortened maturity of firms’ long-term debt. Since
derivatives users have better access to external
capital markets (Chen and King, 2014), they also
have less debt refinancing risk than non-users. In
addition, IR and FX derivatives are the hedging
instruments extensively used by US firms to alle-
viate their future financial risk. Taken together, we
propose our first hypothesis as follows:
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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H1: Firms with financial hedging programs hold
less cash than those without such programs.
Previous financial hedging studies show that
firms do not operate in the perfect capital market
defined by Modigliani and Miller (1958), and
therefore financial hedging may have a positive
effect on firm value through various channels.1
We conjecture that financial hedging also has a
positive effect on firm value through affecting
corporate cash policy. Specifically, financial hedg-
ing may increase the market perceived value of
corporate cash holdings. We summarize a list of
plausible mechanisms which lead to a positive
effect of financial hedging on the value of cash.
First, Faulkender and Wang (2006) find that
the marginal value of cash decreases with the level
of cash holdings. If financial hedging may reduce
corporate cash holdings, then it may subsequently
increase the value of cash holdings. Second, finan-
cial hedging reduces firms’ precautionary motive
for holding cash, so that they can invest cash
more efficiently. Third, financial hedging improves
firms’ access to external credit markets (Campello
et al., 2011; Chen and King, 2014), therefore the
use of financial derivatives may help financially
constrained firms to reduce the costs of external fi-
nancing. By mitigating financial constraints, firms
are less likely to hoard cash for future debt obli-
gation payments. Hence, financially constrained
firms may have a more efficient cash policy with
the help of financial hedging. Fourth, financial
hedging may mitigate the information asymmetry
between managers and shareholders (Dadalt, Gay
and Nam, 2002; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995),
which reduces the monitoring costs of sharehold-
ers. Firms with better external monitoring may
manage cash holdings more efficiently and have
a higher perceived value of cash by the market.
Last, by reducing the monitoring costs of share-
holders, financial hedging may mitigate investors’
concerns about managerial misconduct relating
1The benefits of financial hedging include reducing fi-
nancial distress costs (Mayers and Smith, 1982) and ef-
fective tax payments (Smith and Stulz, 1985), mitigat-
ing agency costs related to risk-shifting, underinvestment
and information asymmetry between firm managers and
shareholders (Campbell andKracaw, 1990;DeMarzo and
Duffie, 1995), increasing internal and external financ-
ing capacity (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Leland,
1998) and reducing underinvestment costs (Carter, Rogers
and Simkins, 2006).
to internal cash management, so investors place
more value on cash holdings. Taken together, our
second hypothesis is:
H2: Firms with financial hedging programs have
a higher value of cash holdings than those
without such programs.
Research design and sample
Baseline regression models
We begin our empirical analysis by investigating
the effect of financial hedging on corporate cash
holdings. Specifically, we employ the following
regression equation:
Cash holdingsi,t
= α + β1F inancial hedging proxyi,t
+ B×Control variablesi,t
+ μt + θj + εi,t (1)
where i is firm index, t is year index, j is industry
index, Cash holdingsi,t is the ratio of cash and
marketable securities to total assets, and Financial
hedging proxyi,t is an indicator variable measur-
ing the use of financial derivatives. Following
previous corporate cash holding studies (e.g.,
Acharya, Almeida and Campello, 2007; Bates,
Kahle and Stulz, 2009; Opler et al., 1999), we
control for the variables related to the precau-
tionary explanations for corporate cash holdings.
These variables include firm size (Sizei,t), cash
flow (CFi,t), market-to-book value (MTBi,t), net
working capital (NWCi,t), capital expenditure
(CAPEXi,t), acquisition expenses (Acquisitionsi,t),
R&D expenses (R&D/Salesi,t), dividends dummy
(Dividendsi,t), cash flow volatility (Sigmai,t) and
leverage (Leveragei,t). To control for the variations
of corporate cash holdings across different indus-
tries and over time, we include year (μt) and Fama
and French (1997) 48-industry (θj) fixed effects in
Eq. (1).
To examine the relation between financial hedg-
ing and the value of corporate cash holdings,
we adopt Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) model,
which estimates the market value of one addi-
tional dollar in cash holdings for shareholders. We
augment Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) regres-
sion with our financial hedging proxies and their
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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interactions with the change in cash holdings:
ri,t − RBi,t = α + β1F inancial hedging proxyi,t
× Ci,t + β2F inancial hedging proxyi,t
+ β3Ci,t + β4Ei,t + β5NAi,t
+ β6R&Di,t + β7Ii,t + β8Di,t
+ β9NFi,t + β10Ci,t−1 + β11Ci,t−1
× Ci,t + β12Li,t + β13Li,t × Ci,t
+ μt + θj + εi,t (2)
where i is firm index, t is year index, j is industry
index, ri,t is stock return during fiscal year t, RBi,t
is benchmark portfolio return at year t and the
benchmark portfolio is one of the 25 Fama and
French (1993) value-weighted portfolios formed
on size and book-to-market ratio, Financial hedg-
ing proxyi,t is an indicator variable measuring the
use of financial derivatives, indicates a change in
the corresponding variables over fiscal year t, Ci,t
is cash and marketable securities, Ei,t is earnings
before interest and extraordinary items, NAi,t is
total assets net of cash, R&Di,t is R&D expenses,
Ii,t is interest expenses, Di,t is common dividends,
and NFi,t is net financing proceeds. All the above
accounting variables are normalized by the 1-year
lagged market value of equity (MVi,t−1). Li,t is
market leverage, equal to total debt divided by
the sum of total debt and market value of equity.
μt and θj are year and Fama–French 48-industry
fixed effects. The independent variable of interest
is the interaction of our financial hedging proxy
with the change in cash holdings: Financial hedg-
ing proxyi,t × Ci,t. Since both the dependent and
explanatory variables are normalized by the 1-
year lagged market value of equity, the estimated
coefficient β3 measures the marginal value of cash:
the dollar change in a firm’s market value for a
1-dollar increase in the firm’s cash holdings. The
estimated coefficient β1 can be interpreted as the
direct effect of financial hedging on the marginal
value of cash. The detailed definitions of our
variables are provided in Appendix A.
Financial hedging variables
To collect corporate financial hedging data, we
adopt a textual analysis of firms’ annual finan-
cial reports and search for the keywords related
to the use of financial derivatives.2 The annual
financial reports include 10-K and 10-K405. For
our sample firm-year observations over the pe-
riod 1993–2016, we develop an automatic web
crawler program in Python, and use the program
to evaluate their annual financial reports stored
in the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and
Retrieval system (EDGAR) database.3 Based on
the keywords commonly used in previous financial
hedging literature (e.g. Campello et al., 2011; Chen
and King, 2014; Guay, 1999; Hoberg and Moon,
2017), we follow the procedure laid out in Hoberg
and Moon (2017), employing three lists of key-
words to identify the use of FX, IR and COMMD
derivatives. The keywords in List A identify the
underlying assets: ‘foreign exchange’, ‘currency’,
‘interest rate’, ‘loan rate’ and ‘commodity’. The
keywords in List B detect the type of financial
derivatives: ‘forward’, ‘future’, ‘option’, ‘swap’,
‘spot’, ‘derivative’, ‘hedge’, ‘hedging’, ‘hedged’,
‘put’, ‘call’, ‘cap’, and ‘collar’. The keywords in
List C confirm the financial hedging positions:
‘contract’, ‘position’, ‘instrument’, ‘agreement’,
‘obligation’, ‘transaction’, and ‘strategy’. In many
cases, firms disclose their financial hedging posi-
tions using more than one sentence. If the annual
financial report of a firm-year contains at least
one word or its plural form from each of these
three lists within a paragraph, we classify the firm
as a derivatives user in the corresponding year.
Specifically, we followHoberg andMoon (2017)
and require that the distance between any two key-
words from the above three lists is less than 25
words within a paragraph.4 If a window with
25 words is found to contain keywords from the
above three lists, it is called a ‘hit’. For each firm–
year observation, we count the ‘hit’ frequency for
each type of financial derivatives and the hedging
position. We classify a firm as a derivatives user in
the corresponding year if the number of ‘hits’ is
2Nguyen, Nguyen and Sila (2019) and Andreou, Harris
and Philip (2020) employ a similar textual-based method
to enlarge their sample size and reduce sample selec-
tion bias.
3Companies were phased into EDGAR filing over a 3-
year period, ending 6 May, 1996. Our main empirical re-
sults are robust over the sample period 1997–2016 during
which electronic filings on EDGAR were mandatory.
4We also require the difference between any two keywords
from the three lists to be less than 20, 30, 35, 40, 45 and
50 words. Untabulated tests show that our main results
are robust.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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positive, and a non-user otherwise. To enhance the
accuracy of our identification, we drop a ‘hit’ if
the paragraph contains false-positive terms such
as ‘in the future’, ‘forward-looking’, ‘not material’,
‘insignificant’, ‘do not/don’t use’, ‘do not/don’t en-
ter’, ‘do not/don’t cover’, or their past-tense forms.
To validate the reliability of our classification, we
randomly select 2% of our sample firm-year
observations and manually assess their annual
reports. We find that the accuracy rates for IR, FX
and COMMD derivatives are 80%, 87% and 78%.
Our accuracy rates are comparable to the range of
80–90% reported in Hoberg and Moon (2017).5
Following prior financial hedging studies (e.g.
Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Bartram, Brown
and Conrad, 2011; Graham and Rogers, 2002;
Manconi, Massimo and Lei, 2018), we measure fi-
nancial hedging activities using two indicator vari-
ables: IR/FX andHedging. IR/FX is equal to 1 if a
firm uses at least one type of IR or FX derivatives,
and 0 otherwise.Hedging is equal to 1 if a firm uses
at least one type of IR, FX or COMMD deriva-
tives, and 0 otherwise.6 In this paper, we do not use
the notional value of derivatives to measure finan-
cial hedging. After SFAS No. 133 became effective
in 2000, it is no longer mandatory for US public
firms to report the notional value of their deriva-
tives contracts, as previously required by SFASNo.
119. Instead, US public firms were only required to
report the fair value of their derivatives positions
after 2000.7 A hedging position with any positive
notional valuewould have a fair value close to zero,
if the underlying asset’s market price is close to the
strike price of the hedging position. As a result,
the recent financial hedging studies usually employ
categorical hedging variables, representing each
firm’s use of a specific type of financial derivatives.
540.6% firm-year observations are FX derivatives users in
our sample, lower than 55.3% reported in Hoberg and
Moon (2017). However, Hoberg and Moon (2017) only
focus onUS firms with offshoring output, which are more
likely to hedge FX risk.
6When we replace IR/FX and Hedging by one of IR, FX
and COMMD indicator variables, our baseline regression
results are qualitatively the same.
7Please refer to SFAS No. 133 for detailed information.
Although a number of firms voluntarily disclose the no-
tional value of their hedging positions after 2000, the no-
tional value information is still noisy and might lead to a
sample selection bias.
Data sources and summary statistics
Our sample covers firms listed on the NYSE,
NASDAQ and AMEX over the period 1993–
2016. Since firms in the financial industry may
hold derivatives for trading purposes and firms in
the utility industry are highly regulated, we follow
the previous financial hedging studies and exclude
firms in these two industries (SIC codes 6000–6999
and 4900–4999) from our sample (e.g. Allayannis
and Weston, 2001; Bartram, Brown and Conrad,
2011). Owing to the EDGAR database’s adoption
of electronic filings in 1993, our sample period
begins in the first year in which electronic filings
are available. Our sample begins in 1993 because
the electronic filings on the EDGAR database
only became effective from then. We collect stock
return data and financial accounting data from
the CRSP/Compustat Merged database, man-
agerial entrenchment data from the Institutional
Shareholder Service (ISS, formerly RiskMetrics)
database, institutional ownership data from the
Thomson Reuters s34 files, Fama–French bench-
mark portfolio returns from Kenneth R. French’s
data library and the counts of sentiment words in
annual financial statements are from Bill McDon-
ald’s personal website. After dropping firm-year
observations with negative assets, negative sales
or negative dividends, our final sample consists of
62,859 firm-year observations with the required
data for estimating Eqs. (1) and (2).
Panel A of Table 1 presents the summary statis-
tics for the variables in our main empirical tests.
All variables in dollar-denominated values are
inflation adjusted to 2016 dollars using the Con-
sumer Price Index from the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. Following the literature, we winsorize
the stock return and accounting variables at the
1% and 99% levels. In our cash-holding tests, cash
holdings and annual cash flows account for 19.4%
and 2.1% of total assets for an average firm. About
33.1% of firm-years pay positive dividends. In our
marginal value of cash tests, the distribution of
stock excess returns is right-skewed with a mean
annual excess return of 1.4% and a median of
−7.7%. On average, firms have increased their
cash holdings over our sample period, with the
mean and median of Ct standing at 0.5% and
0.1%. The mean of Ct−1 is 17.7%, suggesting
that the prior cash balances, on average, account
for 17.7% of the corresponding market value of
equity. The average growth in net assets, earnings,
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Panel A: Summary statistics of variables
Variable Obs. Mean SD p1 p25 Median p75 p99
Dependent variables
Cash holdingst 62,859 0.194 0.221 0.000 0.028 0.104 0.284 0.917
ri,t − RBi,t 62,859 0.014 0.606 −0.981 −0.340 −0.077 0.211 2.960
Independent variables of interest
IR/FXt 62,859 0.595 0.491 0 0 1 1 1
Hedgingt 62,859 0.643 0.479 0 0 1 1 1
Control and instrumental variables
Sizet 62,859 6.118 1.924 2.257 4.692 6.017 7.436 10.887
CFt 62,791 0.021 0.191 −0.952 0.015 0.068 0.110 0.277
MTBt 62,828 1.960 1.449 0.578 1.106 1.486 2.217 8.976
NWCt 61,599 0.082 0.175 −0.377 −0.030 0.067 0.191 0.548
CAPEXt 62,572 0.054 0.058 0.001 0.018 0.036 0.068 0.323
R&D/Salest 62,341 0.255 1.232 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.077 10.338
Acquisitionst 60,811 0.025 0.062 −0.003 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.346
Dividendst 62,859 0.331 0.471 0 0 0 1 1
Sigmat 62,852 0.086 0.048 0.022 0.049 0.077 0.106 0.237
Leveraget 62,859 0.201 0.189 0.000 0.013 0.169 0.328 0.725
Ct−1 54,147 0.177 0.229 0.000 0.034 0.097 0.225 1.293
Ct 54,147 0.005 0.128 −0.471 −0.030 0.001 0.034 0.566
Et 54,147 0.020 0.220 −0.683 −0.029 0.005 0.038 1.262
NAt 54,147 0.006 0.376 −1.712 −0.063 0.011 0.093 1.499
R&Dt 54,147 −0.001 0.022 −0.134 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.076
It 54,147 0.001 0.017 −0.076 −0.002 0.000 0.002 0.081
Dt 54,147 0.000 0.008 −0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038
NFt 54,147 0.028 0.195 −0.569 −0.035 0.000 0.044 1.004
Lt 62,859 0.201 0.221 0.000 0.008 0.128 0.319 0.869
Tax convexityt 62,755 5.344 4.972 −0.818 2.185 4.598 7.175 32.689
Governance variables
G-Indext 18,187 8.920 2.617 4 7 9 11 15
E-Indext 19,546 3.143 1.427 0 2 3 4 6
TMIt 61,975 0.106 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.156 0.637
TBLCt 61,975 0.168 0.144 0.000 0.054 0.145 0.262 0.578
Panel B. The average use of financial derivatives across industries.
Fama–French 10 industries Obs. IR FX COMMD IR/FX Hedging
Consumer NonDurables 4,396 0.417 0.440 0.239 0.587 0.626
Consumer Durables 2,111 0.431 0.505 0.200 0.597 0.622
Manufacturing 10,797 0.466 0.583 0.310 0.673 0.715
Energy 3,196 0.548 0.315 0.879 0.637 0.936
Business Equipment 15,295 0.346 0.553 0.078 0.636 0.651
Telecommunications 1,677 0.568 0.317 0.082 0.640 0.646
Wholesale, Retail, and Services 8,435 0.397 0.279 0.172 0.503 0.550
Health 8,356 0.351 0.358 0.079 0.516 0.543
Other 8,596 0.469 0.332 0.254 0.573 0.631
This panel reports the summary statistics of the variables used in our main empirical tests. Our sample consists of 62,859 firm-year
observations over the fiscal years 1993–2016, with required data for our baseline regressions. The number of observations, mean,
standard deviation, 1st percentile, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile and 99th percentile are reported from left to right, in sequence
for each variable. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All accounting variables in dollars are inflation-adjusted to 2016 dollars. All
inflation-adjusted accounting variables and stock return variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
This panel reports the percentage of firms using financial derivatives across Fama–French 10 industries. Firms in the financial (in the
‘Other’ group) and utility industries are excluded from our sample. Our sample consists of 62,859 firm-year observations over the fiscal
years 1993–2016, with required data for our baseline regressions. We report the percentage of firms using interest rate (IR) derivatives,
the percentage of firms using foreign currency (FX) derivatives, the percentage of firms using commodity (COMMD) derivatives, the
percentage of firms using at least one type of IR or FX derivatives (IR/FX) and the percentage of firms using at least one type of IR,
FX, or COMMD derivatives (Hedging).
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Figure 1. Average percentage of the use of derivatives from 1993 to 2016 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
The sample covers all firms listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX over the period 1993–2016 with positive values for the book value
of total assets and sales revenue. Firms in the financial and utility industries (SIC codes 6000–6999 and 4900–4999) are excluded from
the sample, yielding a panel of 62,859 firm-year observations for 8,235 unique firms. The bottom three lines present the percentage of
firms using interest rate (IR) derivatives, foreign currency (FX) derivatives and commodity (COMMD) derivatives, respectively. The
top two lines present the percentage of firms using at least one type of IR or FX derivatives (IR/FX), and the percentage of firms using
at least one type of IR, FX or COMMD derivatives (Hedging).
R&D, interest expenses and dividends are all close
to zero. The average leverage is 20.1% and the
average of net financing is 2.8%. The summary
statistics of these variables are comparable to
those reported in earlier value-of-cash studies.
Panel A also shows that among 62,859 firm-
years in our effective sample, the mean of IR/FX is
59.5% and the mean of Hedging is 64.3%. Specif-
ically, 31.4% of our sample firm-years adopt IR
derivatives and 27.8% adopt FX derivatives, which
are comparable to the 35.6% and 27.3% reported
in Campello et al. (2011).8 Bartram, Brown and
Conrad (2011) report that 65.1% of US firms use
at least one type of IR, FX or COMMD deriva-
tives, which is comparable to 64.3% in our sample.
Figure 1 shows that over our sample period 1993–
2016, the mean values of IR, FX, COMMD,
IR/FX and Hedging increase from 23.4%, 27.3%,
13.1%, 37.2% and 43.3% to 53.7%, 53.0%, 29.9%,
71.5% and 76.1%, respectively. The popularity of
corporate financial hedging declines slightly dur-
ing the stock market crashes observed in 2000 and
8Campello et al. (2011) manually collect financial hedg-
ing data using a sample of 2,288 US firm-years over
1996–2002. Campello et al.’s (2011) sample only includes
firms with unique information on investment restrictions
in loan covenants, which have a higher incentive to hedge
their IR risk.
2008. Panel B of Table 1 presents the average use
of financial derivatives across the Fama–French
10 industries (Fama and French, 1997), excluding
firms in the financial and utility industries. IR, FX
and COMMD derivatives are most (least) popu-
larly used among firms in the Telecommunications
(Health), Manufacturing (Telecommunications)
and Energy (Health) industry, respectively. IR/FX
and Hedging have the highest mean values in the
Manufacturing and Energy industries.
Main results
Baseline regressions
We begin our empirical analysis by investigating
the relation between financial hedging and cor-
porate cash holdings. Table 2 presents the results
from estimating Eq. (1). In columns (1) and (2),
the coefficients of the financial hedging proxy
variables are negative and statistically significant
at the 1% level after controlling for observable firm
characteristics, indicating that derivatives users
hold less cash than non-users. The impact of fi-
nancial hedging on corporate cash holdings is also
economically meaningful. Column (1) suggests
that on average, firms using at least one type of IR
or FX derivatives hold 0.7% lower cash reserves
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 58,796 58,796
Adjusted-R2 0.528 0.528
This table reports the OLS regressions of corporate cash hold-
ings on financial hedging proxy variables and control variables.
The sample consists of 58,796 firm-year observations of USfirms
over the sample period 1993–2016 with required data for the re-
gressions. The dependent variable is Cash holdingst and the inde-
pendent variables of interest are IR/FXt and Hedgingt. All vari-
ables are defined in Appendix A. The coefficients of the year and
Fama–French 48-industry fixed effects are suppressed for brevity
in the respective columns. t-Statistics based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level are reported in brackets. *, ** and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, re-
spectively.
than those without IR and FX hedging programs.
Column (2) suggests that on average, firms using at
least one type of IR, FX or COMMD derivatives
hold 0.6% lower cash reserves than firms that do
not utilize these hedging instruments. Given that
the average cash-holding ratio in our sample is
19.4%, the reduction in cash holdings is about
3.6% (IR/FX) and 3.1% (Hedging) of an average
firm’s cash holdings.
The sign and statistical significance of the co-
efficients of our control variables are consistent
with those documented in Bates, Kahle and Stulz
(2009), who examine the relation between firm
characteristics and corporate cash holdings. We
find that cash holdings decrease significantly with
firm size, net working capital, capital expenditure,
acquisition expenditures, dividend payments and
leverage. Conversely, cash holdings increase sig-
nificantly with the market-to-book ratio, R&D
expenses and industry cash flow risk. The coef-
ficients of our control variables are statistically
significant at the 1% level. These findings sup-
port the notion that the precautionary motive for
holding cash arises when firms are smaller and
have better investment opportunities, but higher
external financing costs. Our results also provide
strong evidence that firms tend to hold more cash
when they possess higher firm-specific risk and
have limited access to external capital markets.
Next, we examine the impact of financial hedg-
ing on the value of corporate cash holdings using
Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) framework. Ta-
ble 3 presents the results of the ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions of firm excess stock
returns on the change in cash holdings, financial
hedging proxy variables, the interaction of the
previous two variables and control variables. In
column (1), we replicate Faulkender and Wang’s
(2006) baseline regression over their sample pe-
riod 1972–2001. We find that for a firm with zero
leverage and cash holdings equal to 5% of their
market value of equity, the value of an additional
dollar of cash is $1.52 ($1.556 + (−0.742 ∗ 5%)),
similar to the $1.43 documented in Faulkender
and Wang (2006).9 Consistent with Faulkender
and Wang (2006), the estimated coefficients of
Ct−1 × Ct and Lt × Ct are negative and statis-
tically significant at the 1% level, indicating that
the marginal value of cash decreases with the level
of cash holdings and leverage. In columns (2)
and (3), the interaction terms between the change
in cash holdings and financial hedging proxy
variables represent the impact of financial hedg-
ing on the marginal value of cash. As shown in
9Our replication sample includes 89,565 observations,
which are more than the 82,187 observations reported
in Faulkender and Wang (2006). Faulkender and Wang
(2006) drop the observations in their sample falling be-
yond the 1% tail, while we winsorize our variables at
the 1% and 99% tails. In addition, the CRSP/Compustat
Merged dataset was not available in 2006.
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Table 3. Baseline regression II: Financial hedging and marginal value of cash
Variables (1) (2) (3)








Ct 1.556*** 2.073*** 2.071***
[40.68] [33.95] [33.63]
Et 0.524*** 0.568*** 0.567***
[41.40] [30.73] [30.73]
NAt 0.177*** 0.229*** 0.230***
[27.78] [19.76] [19.80]
R&Dt 1.135*** 0.704*** 0.706***
[8.64] [3.97] [3.98]
It −1.792*** −2.828*** −2.827***
[−20.99] [−12.13] [−12.12]
Dt 3.173*** 2.031*** 2.046***
[15.99] [6.72] [6.77]
NFt 0.072*** −0.016 −0.017
[5.82] [−0.66] [−0.70]
Ct−1 0.277*** 0.369*** 0.369***
[21.57] [18.90] [18.86]
Ct−1 × Ct −0.742*** −1.095*** −1.095***
[−12.81] [−11.28] [−11.27]
Lt −0.474*** −0.513*** −0.512***
[−57.52] [−39.81] [−39.68]
Lt × Ct −1.602*** −2.248*** −2.247***
[−21.10] [−16.61] [−16.62]
Constant 0.063*** −0.015 −0.013
[19.95] [−0.36] [−0.33]
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes
Observations 89,565 54,147 54,147
Adjusted-R2 0.205 0.218 0.218
This table reports the OLS regressions of firm excess returns on the change in cash holdings, financial hedging proxy variables, the
interaction of the prior two variables, and control variables. The sample consists of 54,147 firm-year observations of US firms over the
sample period 1993–2016 with required data for the regressions. The dependent variable is ri,t − RBi,t, the annual excess stock return
relative to the 25 Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market portfolios.  indicates the change in the corresponding variables
from year t − 1 to t. In column (1), we replicate Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) baseline regression over the sample period 1972–2001.
All variables are defined in Appendix A. The coefficients of the year and Fama–French 48-industry fixed effects are suppressed for
brevity in the respective columns. t-Statistics based on standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in brackets. *, ** and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
columns (2) and (3), the estimated coefficients of
IR/FXt × Ct and Hedgingt × Ct are positive
and statistically significant at the 5% level. Con-
sistent with our hypothesis, the marginal value of
cash increases with the use of financial derivatives.
The results suggest that the marginal value of
cash is about $0.06 higher for derivatives users
than non-users. The signs of the estimated coeffi-
cients on the other control variables are consistent
with those reported in Faulkender and Wang
(2006).
Overall, the results of our baseline regressions
support H1 and H2.
Endogeneity
One potential endogeneity concern for any corpo-
rate financial hedging study is that firms do not
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make financial hedging decisions randomly (e.g.
Bartram, 2019; Campello et al., 2011; Manconi,
Massimo and Lei, 2018). Firms’ cash policy and
decision to employ financial derivatives may be
spuriously associated with unobservable firm
characteristics. In addition, firms with lower
cash reserves may be more likely to hedge fu-
ture cash flow risk with financial derivatives. The
endogeneity issue is slightly attenuated in our
value-of-cash study, as the marginal value of cash
depends on market investors’ expectations. How-
ever, since investors’ perceived value of cash also
depends on firm choices such as cash holdings,
use of cash and other corporate strategies, we still
need to address the endogeneity concern in our
value-of-cash study. As discussed in Abdallah,
Goergen and O’Sullivan (2015), failure to adjust
for potential endogeneity has severe consequences
in business and management research, such as
drawing inappropriate inferences. To mitigate the
endogeneity concern, we employ the following
three identification approaches: Heckman’s (1978)
treatment effect model, a PSM method and a
high-dimensional fixed effects model.
Heckman’s treatment effect model
Derivatives users and non-users may differ in
many observable or unobservable firm charac-
teristics, leading to the possibility that financial
hedging decisions are made endogenously. In
addition, firms may choose to employ financial
derivatives according to their cash policy and the
value of cash holdings. Therefore, self-selection
bias could arise and result in unreliable OLS
estimates, as shown by Heckman (1978) and
Wooldridge (2010). We follow the earlier financial
hedging literature (e.g. Allayannis, Lel and Miller,
2012; Chen and King, 2014; Manconi, Massimo
and Lei, 2018) and utilize Heckman’s treatment
effect model as our first identification method.
In Heckman’s treatment effect model, the first-
stage probit regression estimates the probability
of adopting financial derivatives, and the second-
stage OLS regression corrects for selection bias by
including the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) estimated
by the first-stage regression as a control variable.
Li and Prabhala (2007) and Huang et al. (2015)
suggest the inclusion of a variable in the first-stage
regression that does not appear in the second-
stage regression. Ideally, this variable should have
an impact on financial hedging decisions, but
should not be related to our outcome variables
such as cash holdings and excess stock returns.10
Inspired by a salient institutional feature of the
US corporate tax code – corporate income tax
convexity, Campello et al. (2011) propose that Tax
convexity estimated by Graham and Smith (1999)
measures the expected tax savings from financial
hedging and may serve as a suitable identification
variable in financial hedging studies. Firms with a
convex income-tax schedule may adopt financial
hedging to reduce their expected tax liability (e.g.
Géczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Nance, Smith
and Smithson, 1993; Smith and Stulz, 1985).
Since the tax benefits of financial hedging differ
across firms with various tax incentives, the cross-
sectional heterogeneity in the expected tax benefits
related to financial hedging may alleviate the con-
cern of weak exclusion restrictions. To facilitate
identification, we follow prior work and use the
1-year lag of Tax convexity as our identification
variable in the first stage of Heckman’s treatment
effect model to estimate IMR (e.g. Campello et al.,
2011; Chen and King, 2014; Manconi, Massimo
and Lei, 2018). The detailed definition of Tax
convexity is provided in Appendix A. To the best
of our knowledge, previous studies do not docu-
ment any relation between Tax convexity and our
cash-related outcome variables. Therefore, Tax
convexity does not seem to violate the exclusion
restriction. In addition, it is unlikely that there
exists any systematic correlation between Tax
convexity and potential measurement errors in our
financial hedging variables.
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of Heck-
man’s treatment effect model for the corporate
cash-holding tests. All the control variables in the
first-stage and second-stage regressions are the
same as those included in Eq. (1). Columns (1) and
(3) report the results of the first-stage selection
equation estimated by probit regressions, in which
the dependent variables are financial hedging
indicator variables IR/FXt and Hedgingt. The
coefficients of Tax convexityt−1 are positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting
that Tax convexityt−1 is positively associated with
firms’ propensity to employ financial derivatives
and satisfies the relevance condition. Columns
(2) and (4) report the results of the second-stage
10The exclusion restriction is not critical in Heckman’s
treatment effect model, as the model is identified by the
non-linearity of IMR (Li and Prabhala, 2007).
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Table 4. Heckman’s treatment effect model
Panel A: Financial hedging and corporate cash holdings.
IR/FX Hedging











Constant 0.645*** 0.262*** 0.706*** 0.270***
[6.41] [10.55] [6.87] [12.08]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50,013 50,013 50,013 50,013
Pseudo/adjusted–R2 0.109 0.526 0.133 0.526
Panel B: Financial hedging and marginal value of cash.
IR/FX Hedging
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)














Constant 0.588*** −0.024 0.680*** 0.001
[6.18] [−0.51] [7.00] [0.03]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 54,054 54,054 54,054 54,054
Pseudo/adjusted–R2 0.099 0.218 0.123 0.218
This panel reports Heckman’s (1978) two-stage regressions of corporate cash holdings on financial hedging proxy variables and control
variables. The sample consists of theUS firm-year observations over the sample period 1993–2016with required data for the regressions.
Tax convexityt−1 is the variable which is included in the first-stage regressions to estimate the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). Columns (1)
and (3) report the results of the first-stage probit regressions, in which the dependent variables are IR/FXt and Hedgingt. Columns
(2) and (4) report the second-stage OLS regression results, in which the dependent variable is Cash holdingst. The inverse Mills ratios,
IMR_IR/FXt and IMR_Hedgingt, are estimated from the first-stage regressions. The control variables are the same as those reported
in Table 2. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The coefficients of the control variables, year fixed effects, and Fama–French 48-
industry fixed effects are suppressed for brevity in the respective columns. t-Statistics based on standard errors clustered at the firm
level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
This panel reports Heckman’s (1978) two-stage regressions of firm excess returns on the change in cash holdings, financial hedging
proxy variables, the interaction of the prior two variables, and control variables. The sample consists of US firm-year observations
over the sample period 1993–2016 with required data for the regressions. Tax convexityt−1 is the variable which is included in the first-
stage regressions to estimate the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). Columns (1) and (3) report the first-stage probit regression results, in which
the dependent variables are IR/FXt and Hedgingt. Columns (2) and (4) report the second-stage OLS regression results, in which the
dependent variable is ri,t − RBi,t, the annual excess stock return relative to the 25 Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market
portfolios. The inverse Mills ratios, IMR_IR/FXt and IMR_Hedgingt, are estimated from the first-stage regressions.  indicates the
change in the corresponding variables from year t − 1 to t. The control variables are the same as those reported in Table 3. All variables
are defined in Appendix A. The coefficients of the control variables, year fixed effects and Fama–French 48-industry fixed effects are
suppressed for brevity in the respective columns. t-Statistics based on standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in brackets.
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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OLS regressions, in which we estimate the impact
of financial hedging on corporate cash holdings.
In the second-stage regressions, the dependent
variables are Cash holdingst and the independent
variables of interest are the two financial hedging
indicator variables. We include IMR_IR/FXt and
IMR_Hedgingt estimated in the corresponding
first-stage regressions to control for any potential
selection bias. The coefficients of IR/FXt and
Hedgingt remain negative and statistically signif-
icant at the 5% and 10% levels, suggesting that
the hedging effect on cash holdings is robust after
controlling for potential self-selection biases.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results of Heck-
man’s treatment effect model for the marginal
value of cash tests. All the control variables in the
first-stage and second-stage regressions are the
same as those included in Eq. (2). Columns (1) and
(3) report the results of the first-stage selection re-
gressions. The coefficients of Tax convexityt−1 are
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level,
which supports the relevance condition. Columns
(2) and (4) report the results of the second-stage
regressions. The coefficients of IR/FXt × Ct
and Hedgingt × Ct are positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level after controlling for the
potential selection bias.
Taken together, after mitigating endogeneity
concerns with Heckman’s treatment effect model,
our baseline regression results remain robust. We
still observe a negative relation between financial
hedging and corporate cash holdings and a pos-
itive relation between financial hedging and the
marginal value of cash.
Propensity score matching
Heckman’s model helps us to mitigate endogeneity
concerns due to unobserved firm heterogeneity
and measurement errors in our regression vari-
ables. If the differences in corporate cash policy
or in the value of cash are associated with the firm
characteristics affecting firms’ financial hedging
decisions, then the impact of financial hedging on
corporate cash holdings or the value of cash may
be driven by other confounding factors. In this sec-
tion, we employ a PSM strategy as an alternative
identification method to alleviate any endogeneity
due to potential confounding variables.
Specifically, we follow Bartram, Brown and
Conrad (2011) and use probit models to estimate
the propensity scores of firms that use financial
derivatives. We include the control variables in
regression Eqs. (1) and (2) as observable firm
characteristics in the probit models to separately
estimate the propensity scores. Next, we adopt
a nearest-neighbour matching approach without
replacement and use the propensity score to find a
control firm for each derivatives user. We require
that the maximum difference in the propensity
scores between derivatives users and non-users
does not exceed 0.5% in absolute value. Panels A
andB of Table 5 report the univariate comparisons
of firm characteristics between derivatives users
and matched non-users for our corporate cash-
holding tests and marginal value-of-cash tests. In
these two panels, we classify firms as derivatives
users using IR/FX in columns (1)–(3) and using
Hedging in columns (4)–(6). Columns (1)–(2) and
(4)–(5) report the mean value of firm characteris-
tics, and columns (3) and (6) report the t-statistics
of the univariate comparisons between derivatives
users and matched non-users. All t-statistics are
not statistically significant at the 10% level, except
Lt in column (6) of Panel B, indicating that firms
in the control groups and treatment groups have
comparable firm characteristics.
In Panel C of Table 5, we re-estimate Eq. (1)
using the PSM sample. The coefficients of IR/FXt
and Hedgingt are negative and statistically signifi-
cant at the 1% level. On average, firms using at least
one type of IR or FX derivatives hold 1.0% lower
cash reserves than matched non-users, while firms
using at least one type of IR, FX, or COMMD
derivatives hold 0.8% lower cash reserves than
matched non-users. In Panel D of Table 5, we
re-estimate Eq. (2) using the PSM sample. The co-
efficients of IR/FXt × Ct and Hedgingt × Ct
remain positive and statistically significant at the
1% level. On average, the marginal value of cash is
about $0.10 higher for firms using at least one type
of IR or FX derivatives than matched non-users,
while the marginal value of cash is about $0.12
higher for firms using at least one type of IR, FX
or COMMD derivatives than matched non-users.
The financial hedging effects on cash holdings
and the value of cash remain robust to the PSM
identification method.
High-dimensional fixed effects
In the third identification method, we follow
Gormley and Matsa (2014) and control for unob-
served heterogeneity across firms and time-varying
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Table 5. Propensity score matching
Panel A: Differences in firm characteristics between derivatives users and non-users: cash holding tests.
IR/FX matched sample (16,699 pairs) Hedging matched sample (15,417 pairs)
Users Non-users t-Stat. Users Non-users t-Stat.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sizet 5.700 5.681 1.01 5.544 5.548 −0.19
CFt 0.013 0.013 −0.27 0.007 0.009 −0.87
MTBt 1.966 1.975 −0.54 2.004 1.987 0.98
NWCt 0.090 0.090 −0.06 0.093 0.095 −0.71
CAPEXt 0.056 0.056 0.09 0.051 0.052 −0.52
R&D/Salest 0.307 0.302 0.32 0.343 0.333 0.63
Acquisitionst 0.024 0.024 −0.53 0.024 0.024 0.10
Dividendst 0.301 0.295 1.16 0.286 0.286 −0.09
Sigmat 0.085 0.086 −0.25 0.085 0.085 0.62
Leveraget 0.569 0.566 0.18 0.535 0.540 −0.38
Panel B: Differences in firm characteristics between derivatives users and non-users: Value of cash tests.
IR/FX matched sample (17,247 pairs) Hedging matched sample (15,649 pairs)
Users Non-users t-Stat. Users Non-Users t-Stat.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ct 0.002 0.002 0.05 0.001 0.002 −0.58
Et 0.023 0.021 0.57 0.023 0.021 0.66
NAt −0.003 0.000 −0.87 −0.004 0.000 −0.87
R&Dt −0.001 −0.001 −0.67 −0.001 −0.001 −0.52
It 0.000 0.000 −0.20 0.000 0.001 −0.87
Dt 0.000 0.000 −0.75 0.000 0.000 −0.24
NFt 0.031 0.030 0.56 0.028 0.028 0.01
Ct−1 0.184 0.183 0.67 0.188 0.187 0.64
Ct−1 × Ct −0.010 −0.010 −0.16 −0.011 −0.010 −0.97
Lt 0.188 0.190 −0.97 0.178 0.184 −2.38*
Lt × Ct 0.000 0.000 0.15 −0.001 −0.001 −0.70








Control variables Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 33,398 30,834
Adjusted-R2 0.542 0.539
Panel D: Financial hedging and marginal value of cash.
Variables (1) (2)




Hedgingt × Ct 0.122***
[3.33]
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
Financial Hedging, Corporate Cash Policy and the Value of Cash 15
Table 5. (Continued)








Control variables Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 34,494 31,298
Adjusted-R2 0.223 0.220
This panel reports the univariate comparisons of firm characteristics between derivatives users and matched non-users. We use a probit
model to estimate the propensity scores, in which the dependent variables are IR/FXt andHedgingt, and the independent variables are
the control variables in Eq. (1). We use a one-to-one nearest-neighbour match and require that the difference in the propensity scores
between derivatives users and matched non-users does not exceed 0.5% in absolute value. In columns (1)–(2) and (4)–(5), we report the
mean value of firm characteristics. In columns (3) and (6), we report the t-statistics of the univariate comparisons between derivatives
users and matched non-users. All variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
This panel reports the univariate comparisons of firm characteristics between derivatives users and matched non-users. We use a probit
model to estimate the propensity scores in which the dependent variables are IR/FXt andHedgingt, and the independent variables are
the control variables in Eq. (2). We use a one-to-one nearest-neighbour match and require that the difference in the propensity scores
between derivatives users and matched non-users does not exceed 0.5% in absolute value. In columns (1)–(2) and (4)–(5), we report the
mean value of firm characteristics. In columns (3) and (6), we report the t-statistics of the univariate comparisons between derivatives
users and matched non-users. All variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
This panel reports the results of re-estimating Eq. (1) using the PSM sample. The dependent variable isCash holdingst and the indepen-
dent variables of interest are IR/FXt and Hedgingt. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The coefficients of the control variables,
year fixed effects and Fama–French 48-industry fixed effects are suppressed for brevity in the respective columns. t-Statistics based on
standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
This panel reports the results of re-estimating Eq. (2) using the PSM sample. The dependent variable is ri,t − RBi,t, the annual excess
stock return relative to the 25 Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market portfolios. indicates the change in the corresponding
variables from year t − 1 to t. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The coefficients of the control variables, year fixed effects,
and Fama–French 48-industry fixed effects are suppressed for brevity in the respective columns. t-Statistics based on standard errors
clustered at the firm level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
heterogeneity across industries in our baseline re-
gressions. Unobservable firm characteristics may
be correlated with financial hedging and affect
corporate cash policies and the value of cash
holdings. Since such potential hidden bias may
still remain after matching by propensity scores,
we adopt a high-dimensional fixed effects model
to directly control for unobserved heterogeneity.
In Panel A of Table 6, we re-estimate Eq. (1)
with the firm and industry-year fixed effects. Con-
sistent with the baseline regression results reported
in Table 2, the estimated coefficients of IR/FXt
and Hedgingt remain positive and statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level. After controlling for unob-
served firm characteristics, derivatives users hold
1.4% lower cash reserves than non-users. In Panel
B of Table 6, we re-estimate Eq. (2) with the firm
and industry-year fixed effects. The coefficients
of IR/FXt × Ct and Hedgingt × Ct remain
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
On average, the marginal value of cash is about
$0.07 higher for derivatives users than non-users.
Why financial hedging increases the value of cash
Our analysis so far indicates that firms with fi-
nancial hedging programs tend to hold a lower
amount of cash but have a higher market per-
ceived value of cash. We conjecture that financial
hedging may reduce corporate cash holdings
through three channels: cash flow uncertainty,
volatile investment opportunity and financial risk.
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 6. High-dimensional fixed effects








Control variables Yes Yes
Industry × Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 57,653 57,653
Adjusted-R2 0.812 0.811
Panel B: Financial hedging and marginal value of cash.
Variables (1) (2)












Control variables Yes Yes
Industry × Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 53,096 53,096
Adjusted-R2 0.305 0.305
This panel reports the results of re-estimating Eq. (1). Following Gormley and Matsa (2014), we use the high-dimensional fixed effects
model (firm and interacted industry-year fixed effects) to control for unobserved firm characteristics. The sample consists of the US
firm-year observations over the sample period 1993–2016with required data for the regressions. The dependent variable isCash holdingst
and the independent variables of interest are IR/FXt and Hedgingt. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The coefficients of the
control variables, year fixed effects and Fama–French 48-industry fixed effects are suppressed for brevity in the respective columns.
t-Statistics based on standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
This panel reports the results of re-estimating Eq. (2). Following Gormley and Matsa (2014), we use the high-dimensional fixed effects
model (firm and interacted industry-year fixed effects) to control for unobserved firm characteristics. The sample consists of US firm-
year observations over the sample period 1993–2016 with required data for the regressions. The dependent variable is ri,t − RBi,t, the
annual excess stock return relative to the 25 Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market portfolios.  indicates the change in
the corresponding variables from year t − 1 to t. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The coefficients of the control variables,
year fixed effects and Fama–French 48-industry fixed effects are suppressed for brevity in the respective columns. t-Statistics based on
standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
As discussed in earlier, these three channels have
been well documented in previous studies. As for
the positive effect of financial hedging on the value
of cash, Smith and Stulz (1985) show that corpo-
rate financial hedging reduces a firm’s cash flow
volatility. Therefore, firms using financial deriva-
tives should have a lower precautionary demand
for cash holdings. Since the marginal value of
cash is negatively related to cash holdings (Faulk-
ender and Wang, 2006), it is intuitive that one
direct channel through which financial hedging
increases the value of cash is the negative impact
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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of financial hedging on corporate cash holdings.
In this section, we further explore four plausible
mechanisms (discussed earlier) of the positive
financial hedging effect on the value of cash.
Investment channel
Campello et al. (2011) show that derivatives users
have higher capital expenditures than non-users.
Financial hedging may enable firms to invest cash
in positive NPV projects instead of hoarding cash
for the precautionary motive, which enhances
the value of cash holdings. To further explore
the investment channel, we extend the seminal
investment-Q framework (Baker, Stein and Wur-
gler, 2003) by adding our financial hedging proxies
and their interactions with Tobin’s Q, cash flow
and cash holdings:
Investmenti,t+1
= α + β1F inancial hedging proxyi,t
+β2F inancial hedging proxyi,t × Qi,t
+ β3F inancial hedging proxyi,t
×CFi,t + β4F inancial hedging proxyi,t
×Cash holdingsi,t + β5Qi,t
+β6CFi,t + β7Cash holdingsi,t + B
×Control variablesi,t
+μt + θj + εi,t (3)
where the control variables include Size, Prof-
itability, CF volatility, Leverage and Z-score
(Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 2003; Campello et al.,
2011). McLean, Zhang and Zhao (2012) show
that investment-Q and investment-cash flow sen-
sitivities are associated with ex-post investment
efficiency. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 show
that there is a positive relation between financial
hedging and firm investment after controlling
for firm characteristics. This result is consistent
with Campello et al.’s (2011) finding that deriva-
tives users tend to invest more than non-users. In
columns (3) and (4), we add the interaction terms
IR/FXt × Qt andHedgingt × Qt, respectively. The
coefficients of these two interaction terms are
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level,
suggesting that financial hedging increases firm-
level capital allocation efficiency manifested in
investment sensitivity to future growth opportuni-
ties. Further, we add the interaction terms between
financial hedging and cash flow in columns (5)
and (6) and the interaction terms between finan-
cial hedging and cash holdings in columns (7)
and (8). The coefficients of IR/FXt × Qt and
Hedgingt × Qt remain positive and statistically
significant. More importantly, the coefficients of
the interaction terms between financial hedging
and cash flow (cash holdings) are positive and
statistically significant at the 5% and 1% levels.
These results support the notion that financial
hedging strengthens the positive relation between
investment and internal cash. Overall, our findings
confirm the investment mechanism that financial
hedging not only increases the investment sensitiv-
ity to internal cash, but also has a positive effect
on investment efficiency.
Financial constraints
Firms with financial constraints may forgo posi-
tive NPV projects when internal funds are in short
supply (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988).
Campello et al. (2011) and Chen and King (2014)
find that corporate financial hedging may mitigate
the underinvestment problem by alleviating firms’
financial constraints and reducing the cost of
raising external funds. Therefore, financial hedg-
ing may help firms with financial constraints to
free cash from serving debt obligations and invest
cash into positive NPV projects. We posit that the
positive relation between financial hedging and
the value of cash is stronger for firms with tighter
financial constraints.
We employ two proxies for financial constraints.
The first proxy is KZ-Index, constructed by Ka-
plan and Zingales (1997) and Lamont, Polk and
Saaá-Requejo (2001). KZ-Index is a relative mea-
sure of firms’ dependence on external financing.
Firms with a higher KZ-Index are more likely
to experience difficulties when financial condi-
tions tighten. The second proxy is SA-Index, the
size–age index developed by Hadlock and Pierce
(2010). By comparing a group of quantitative
measures of financial constraints to the related
qualitative information from firms’ financial re-
ports, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find that firm
age and size have a higher explanatory power in
predicting firms’ future financial constraint status.
A firm is assigned to the financially constrained
(unconstrained) sub-sample if its KZ-Index or
SA-Index is above (below) the annual median.
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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estimating Eq. (2) using the sub-samples with
financially constrained and unconstrained firms.
The estimated coefficients of IR/FXt × Ct and
Hedgingt × Ct are positive but only statistically
significant in the sub-samples with financially con-
strained firms, suggesting that the positive impact
of financial hedging on the marginal value of cash
only exists among financially constrained firms.
This finding supports our conjecture that financial
hedging helps financially constrained firms to re-
duce the cost of raising external funds and enables
them to invest cash into positive NPV projects,
instead of hoarding cash for debt obligation
payments. Through such a channel, the market
perceived value of cash for financially constrained
firms increases with the use of financial derivatives.
Information asymmetry
The third channel through which financial hedg-
ing has a positive effect on the value of cash is via
mitigating the information asymmetry between
managers and shareholders. Given that the re-
lease of financial information is costly and firm
managers have an incentive to manipulate or hide
unfavourable financial information, shareholders
have less information on firms’ future cash flows
than managers. DeMarzo and Duffie’s (1995) the-
oretical model predicts that financial hedging can
reduce information asymmetry between managers
and shareholders by eliminating the extraneous
noise in firms’ future cash flows. Dadalt, Gay and
Nam (2002) provide empirical evidence supporting
the conjecture of DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) that
the use of financial derivatives reduces the noise re-
lated to exogenous factors and hence improves the
informativeness of corporate earnings. Since the
reduction in asymmetric information decreases the
monitoring costs of shareholders, managers may
use cash more efficiently when they allocate inter-
nal capital for positiveNPVprojects. Therefore, we
expect that the positive relation between financial
hedging and the value of cash is more pronounced
for firms with higher information asymmetry.
We assign firms in sub-samples based on two
proxies of asymmetric information. The first
proxy for asymmetric information is FDIS, the
standard deviation of financial analysts’ earnings
forecasts over a 3-month window before the fiscal
year end (Chen and King, 2014). Dadalt, Gay and
Nam (2002) show that the dispersion of analysts’
earnings forecasts is positively related to the level
of asymmetric information. Chen andKing (2014)
further find that financial hedging may reduce the
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. A firm
is assigned to the high (low) information asym-
metry sub-sample if its FDIS is above (below) the
annual median. Our second proxy for asymmetric
information is ACCM, the prior 3 years’ moving
sum of the absolute value of discretionary ac-
cruals, where discretionary accruals are estimated
from the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan
and Sweeney, 1995; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011).11
Firms with a larger absolute value of discretionary
accruals are more likely to manipulate earnings,
which makes it more difficult for shareholders
to accurately assess the disclosed financial in-
formation (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995;
Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian, 2009; Kim, Li
and Zhang, 2011). A firm is assigned to the high
(low) information asymmetry sub-sample if its
ACCM is above (below) the annual median.
Panel B of Table 8 reports the results of estimat-
ing Eq. (2) using the sub-samples with high and
low information asymmetry. The estimated coef-
ficients of IR/FXt× Ct and Hedgingt × Ct are
positive, but only statistically significant in the sub-
sample of firms with high information asymmetry,
suggesting that the positive impact of financial
hedging on the marginal value of cash only exists
among firms with a high level of asymmetric infor-
mation. This finding is consistent with our expec-
tation that financial hedging improves information
transparency between managers and shareholders,
subsequently reducing shareholders’ monitoring
costs. Through this mechanism, financial hedging
increases managers’ efficiency in using internal
cash, and consequently increases the perceived
value of corporate cash holdings by the market.
Agency problems
Firms with higher asymmetric information are
more prone to agency problems. Previous studies
show that firms with poor corporate governance
incur agency costs of holding cash (Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford,Mansi andMaxwell,
2008). A recent study by You et al. (2019) finds
that the value of cash decreases during recessions
due to investors’ concern pertaining to agency
conflict, but well-designed investor protection
11Discretionary accruals are denoted asOPAQUE inHut-
ton, Marcus and Tehranian (2009).
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may mitigate this effect. Since financial hedging
reduces information asymmetry and investor
monitoring costs, we conjecture that the positive
relation between financial hedging and the value
of cash is more pronounced for firms with weaker
corporate governance.
We adopt two proxies to separate firms based
on agency conflict. The first proxy is E-Index, the
anti-takeover index developed by Bebchuk, Cohen
and Ferrell (2009). Our second proxy is TBLC,
total ownership of blockholders who hold more
than 5% of a firm’s stocks (Cumming et al., 2019;
Edmans, 2014). Previous studies show that firms
with higher E-Index and lower TBLC are more
prone to agency problems. Panel C of Table 8
reports the results of estimating Eq. (2) using the
sub-samples with high and low agency conflict.
The estimated coefficients of IR/FXt × Ct and
Hedgingt × Ct are positive, but only statistically
significant in the sub-sample of firms with high
agency conflict. This result supports our conjec-
ture that financial hedging reduces monitoring
costs and mitigates the potential agency conflict
between managers and shareholders, leading to a
higher market perceived value of cash holdings.
Industry-specific analyses
Panel B of Table 1 shows that derivatives use
exhibits variations across the Fama–French 10
industries. To provide a full picture of the role
played by financial hedging in corporate cash
policy, we conduct the following industry-specific
analyses. For brevity, we only report the results us-
ing IR/FX. Panel A of Table 9 shows that there is a
negative relation between derivatives use and cash
holdings among the Fama–French 10 industries,
except for the Telecommunications industry. These
results indicate that the negative relation between
financial hedging and cash holdings is not merely
driven by the possibility that some industries tend
to hold less cash but use more derivatives than oth-
ers. Panel B of Table 9 shows that the coefficients
of IR/FXt × Ct are positive and statistically
significant, except for the Consumer Durable,
Telecommunications, and Wholesale, Retail and
Services industries. However, the firm-year obser-
vations in these three industries only account for
about 19.4% of our sample firm-year observations.
Discussion of our findings in comparison with
previous studies
Using the data on S&P 500 firms in 1994, Opler
et al. (1999) show that cash holdings are unrelated
to whether a firm uses financial derivatives, but
positively related to the intensity of derivatives
usage. Opler et al.’s (1999) findings provide weak
evidence that derivatives use is positively related
to cash holdings (complementary), which is in-
consistent with our findings. Using a sample of
S&P 500 manufacturing firms during 1993–1997,
Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell (2007) show that
a firm’s propensity to use financial derivatives or
to hold a large cash balance is highest when it op-
erates in a more competitive industry. Haushalter,
Klasa and Maxwell’s (2007) findings suggest that
in the product market context, derivatives use is
negatively related to cash holdings (substitutes),
which is consistent with our findings.
Neither of these two studies focus on the rela-
tion between financial hedging and cash holdings.
The motivation of Opler et al. (1999) is to identify
a large set of factors driving the change in cash
holdings, while Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell
(2007) investigate the impact of product market
competition on corporate cash holdings and fi-
nancial hedging policy. Since the hedging–cash
relation is not the main focus in these two pa-
pers, their empirical tests do not address the
potential endogeneity between cash holdings
and financial hedging policy. In addition, their
samples may not be comprehensive to reach a
solid conclusion on the hedging–cash relation.
For each Fama–French 48 industry, we calculate
its Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) based on
the firms’ annual sales. Then, we divide firms into
two sub-samples using the median of the industry
HHI. Industries with high HHI have low product
market competition. Untabulated results show
that financial hedging has a negative impact on
cash holdings and a positive effect on the value of
cash in both the high and low HHI sub-samples.
Our findings suggest that the impact of derivatives
use on cash holdings and the value of cash is not
conditional on product market competition.
Using the data on 155 US oil and gas producers
during 1998-2017, Choi et al. (2021) find that
financial hedging reduces the value of cash. Panel
B of Table 9 shows that financial hedging still
has a positive and statistically significant effect on
the value of cash in the Energy industry, which
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is inconsistent with Choi et al.’s (2021) findings.
To further explore what derives the difference be-
tween our results and those of Choi et al. (2021),
we restrict our sample to firms with SIC codes
1311, 1321, 1381, 1382 and 1389, the same as Choi
et al. (2021). Over the sample period 1998–2017,
Choi et al.’s (2021) sample covers 155 unique firms
and 1,364 firm-year observations for their value-
of-cash tests. However, over the similar sample
period 1998–2016, we have 275 unique firms and
1,851 firm-year observations.12 The average use
of IR, COMMD and all types of derivatives is
similar between our sample and theirs. However,
about 32.1% of our 1,851 sample firm-years use
FX derivatives, compared to 18.4% of 1,364 firm-
years in their sample. Next, we re-estimate our
value of cash baseline regression in the sample of
1,851 firm-year observations. Untabulated results
show that apart from IR×C, the coefficients
of FX×C, COMMD×C, IR/FX×C and
Hedging×C are all positive and statistically
significant at the 5% and 1% levels.
Supplementary tests
In this section, we examine whether our baseline
regression results remain robust after controlling
for corporate governance, cash regimes, alternative
measures of cash holdings, and the tone of annual
financial statements. We also conduct robustness
tests using lagged financial hedging variables.13
Controlling for corporate governance
Previous studies suggest that corporate gover-
nance is related to both cash policy and financial
hedging (e.g. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007;
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Pinkowitz, Stulz and
Williamson, 2006). We choose not to control for
corporate governance in our baseline regressions,
because the required governance data, especially
entrenchment governance indices, substantially
reduces our sample size. Nonetheless, to ensure
that the effect of financial hedging remains robust
12Since Choi et al. (2021) do not disclose any data-
collection filters besides SIC codes, we cannot identify
what derives the difference between our sample observa-
tions and theirs.
13Untabulated empirical results discussed in this section
are reported in our Online Appendix.
to additional corporate governance control vari-
ables, we re-estimate our baseline regressions using
a sub-sample of firms with available corporate
governance proxies, namely G-Index (Gompers,
Ishii and Metrick, 2003), E-Index (Bebchuk,
Cohen and Ferrell, 2009), motivated monitoring
institutional ownership (Fich, Harford and Tran,
2015; Ward, Yin and Zeng, 2018) and blockholder
ownership (Cumming et al., 2019; Edmans, 2014).
Untabulated results show that our baseline regres-
sion results remain robust after controlling for
these corporate governance proxy variables.
Controlling for cash regimes
As widely discussed in previous studies, corporate
cash policy and the marginal value of cash vary
considerably across firms within different cash
regimes. Halford et al. (2017) suggest that failure
to control for cash regimes leads to a biased esti-
mation when studying the value of cash in Faulk-
ender and Wang’s (2006) framework. We follow
Halford et al. (2017) and classify firms into three
ex-post cash regimes: raising cash, distributing
cash and servicing debt. Then we re-estimate our
baseline regressions in these three cash regimes.
We find that the impact of financial hedg-
ing on corporate cash holdings is negative and
statistically significant in the raising cash and
distributing cash regimes. In addition, we find
that the estimated coefficients of IR/FXt × Ct
and Hedgingt × Ct are positive and statistically
significant in the raising cash and distributing
cash regimes, but not statistically significant in the
servicing debt regime. Our findings indicate that
firms’ financial hedging activities should have no
impact on the value of cash if an extra dollar of
cash is claimed by debt-holders instead of stock-
holders, which is consistent with the theory of
maximizing shareholder value (Smith and Stulz,
1985).
Alternative measures of cash holdings
In our baseline analyses, we focus on the total
amount of corporate cash holdings, which is the
sum of cash and marketable securities. Next, we
examine whether our main results are robust to
two alternative measures of cash holdings. First,
following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and
Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009), we examine the
excess cash holdings that are non-essential for
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corporate operations and investment. We de-
fine Excess cash holdings as the amount of cash
holdings above a predicted optimal level of cash
reserves. Second, we adopt industry-adjusted cash
holdings as our second alternative measure of
cash holdings. Since corporate cash policy may
be subject to industry-specific shocks, we follow
Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell (2007) and define
Industry-adjusted cash holdings as the cash-to-total
assets ratio minus the median of the cash-to-total
assets ratios of all firms with the same four-digit
SIC codes. Untabulated results show that our
baseline regression results remain robust to these
alternative measures of cash holdings.
Controlling for persistent tone of financial
statements
Loughran and McDonald (2011) find that the
persistent tone of 10-K statements, measured
by a list of negative words, is related to many
corporate activities. Bodnaruk, Loughran and
McDonald (2015) further show that the frequency
of constraining words predicts future liquidity
events. To address the concern that negative tone-
related textual measures parsed from 10-K reports
may affect the impact of financial hedging on
corporate cash policy, we adopt four categories
(Negative, Uncertainty, Litigious and Constrain-
ing) of negative word lists using the sentiment
word counts developed by Loughran and Mc-
Donald (2011). We scale the number of sentiment
word counts by the count of all words appearing
in the Loughran–McDonald Master Dictionary
(2018). After controlling for the four categories
of negative tone-related textual measures, untab-
ulated results show that our main results remain
robust, suggesting that our findings are not driven
by the persistent tone of 10-K reports.
Long-term benefits of financial hedging
In our empirical tests, the variables of interest
and dependent variables are measured in the
same year. However, previous financial hedging
studies suggest that firms adopt financial deriva-
tives persistently to hedge their risk exposures.
To investigate whether firms have any long-term
benefits from their hedging strategies, we replace
the contemporaneous financial hedging variables
in our baseline regressions by their lagged terms:
IR/FXt−1, IR/FXt−2, Hedgingt−1 and Hedgingt−2.
Untabulated results show that our main results
are robust to 1-year and 2-year lagged hedging
variables. Our finding suggests that the benefits of
financial hedging on corporate cash policy are not
short-lived. The lead–lag relation between cash
variables and financial hedging further mitigates
the potential reverse-causality concern.
Additional evidence of the role of financial hedging
In our mechanism analysis, we argue that deriva-
tives use may mitigate financial constraints, infor-
mation asymmetry and agency problems. Through
these mechanisms, financial hedging is positively
related to the value of cash holdings. To directly
examine the impact of derivatives use on financial
constraints, information asymmetry and corporate
governance, we regress the proxy variables of fi-
nancial constraints, asymmetric information, and
corporate governance on financial hedging proxy
variables and control variables. Consistent with
ourmechanism analysis, we useKZ-Index and SA-
Index as the proxy for financial constraints, FDIS
and ACCM as the proxy for information asymme-
try, and E-Index and TBLC as the proxy for corpo-
rate governance. The control variables are the same
as those reported in Eq. (1). Consistent with our
argument in the mechanism analysis, our finding
suggests that financial hedging is negatively related
to financial constraints and information asymme-
try, and positively related to corporate governance.
Conclusions
Firm performance is highly dependent on corpo-
rate risk management to hedge future financial
risk (Ding, Zhang and Duygun, 2019). In this
paper, we employ a textual analysis approach to
collect the use of financial derivatives data from
firms’ annual financial reports. We examine an
important yet understudied aspect of corporate
risk management: the impact of financial hedg-
ing on corporate cash holdings and the value of
cash. Based on a large sample of US public firms
from 1993 to 2016, we find strong evidence that
cash holdings are negatively associated with firm
financial hedging activities. We also show that
the value of corporate cash holdings increases
with firms’ financial hedging activities. Besides
the intuitive channel that the negative impact
of financial hedging on cash holdings leads to a
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higher value of cash, we provide evidence on four
additional mechanisms through which financial
hedging increases the value of cash: improving in-
vestment efficiency, reducing financial constraints,
reducing information asymmetry and mitigating
agency problems. Overall, our study suggests that
managers should incorporate financial risk man-
agement strategies into corporate cash policy, as
doing so appears to be valued positively by share-
holders when they evaluate a firm’s efficiency in
using internal cash. Although our findings support
the positive effect of financial hedging on the value
of cash, one important caveat is that we cannot
rule out the possible negative role played by finan-
cial hedging in incentivizing managers to misuse
internal cash. Our empirical evidence only reflects
the net effect of financial hedging on the value of
cash.
Appendix
Table A1. Variable definitions
Variable Definition Source
Cash holdingst Cash plus marketable securities, normalized by total assets (Bates,
Kahle and Stulz, 2009).
Compustat
rt − RBt Excess stock returns with the benchmark portfolios defined as
Fama–French 25 portfolios formed on size and book-to-market
(Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
CRSP, Compustat and FF
IR/FXt An indicator variable, equal to 1 if a firm uses at least one type of
interest rate (IR) or foreign currency (FX) derivatives, and 0
otherwise (Campello et al., 2011).
EDGAR 10-K
Hedgingt An indicator variable, equal to 1 if a firm uses at least one type of IR,
FX or commodity (COMMD) derivatives, and 0 otherwise (Hoberg
and Moon, 2017).
EDGAR 10-K
Sizet Natural logarithm of total assets (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). Compustat
CFt Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization minus
interests, tax and common dividends, normalized by total assets
(Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009).
Compustat
MTBt Ratio of the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity
plus the market value of equity to the book value of total assets
(Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009).
Compustat
NWCt Net working capital minus cash and marketable securities, normalized
by total assets (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009).
Compustat
CAPEXt Capital expenditures, normalized by total assets (Bates, Kahle and
Stulz, 2009).
Compustat
R&D/Salest Ratio of R&D expenses to total sales. R&D/Sales is equal to 0 if R&D
expenses are missing (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009).
Compustat
Acquisitionst Acquisition expenditures, normalized by total assets (Bates, Kahle and
Stulz, 2009).
Compustat
Dividendst Indicator variable, equal to 1 if a firm pays positive common dividend,
and 0 otherwise (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009).
Compustat
Sigmat Average of the standard deviations of CF over 10 years for firms with
the same two-digit SIC codes (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009).
Compustat
Leveraget Total debt, normalized by total assets (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). Compustat
MVt Market value of equity, defined as the number of shares outstanding
multiplied by stock price (Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
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Table A1. (Continued)
Variable Definition Source
Ct Cash plus marketable securities, normalized by MV at the start of
fiscal year t (Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
Ct Change in cash plus marketable securities from fiscal year t − 1 to year
t, normalized by MV at the start of fiscal year t (Faulkender and
Wang, 2006).
Compustat
Et Change in earnings from fiscal year t − 1 to year t, normalized byMV
at the start of fiscal year t. Earnings are calculated as earnings before
extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits and investment
tax credits (Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
NAt Change in net assets from fiscal year t − 1 to year t, normalized by MV
at the start of fiscal year t. Net assets are calculated as total assets
minus cash holdings (Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
R&Dt Change in R&D expenditure from fiscal year t − 1 to year t,
normalized by MV at the start of fiscal year t (Faulkender and
Wang, 2006).
Compustat
It Change in interest expenses from fiscal year t − 1 to year t, normalized
by MV at the start of fiscal year t (Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
Dt Change in total common share dividends from fiscal year t − 1 to year
t, normalized by MV at the start of fiscal year t (Faulkender and
Wang, 2006).
Compustat
NFt Net financing proceeds defined as equity issuance minus repurchases,
plus debt issuance minus debt redemption, normalized by MV at the
start of fiscal year t (Faulkender and Wang, 2006).
Compustat
Lt Total debt divided by the sum of total debt and MV (Faulkender and
Wang, 2006).
Compustat
Tax convexity Tax convexity
= 4.88 + 0.019TIVol − 5.50TICorr − 1.28DITC + 7.15DSmallNeg +
1.60DSmallPos + DNOL(3.29 − 4.77DSmallNeg − 1.93DSmallPos), where
TIVol is taxable income volatility; TICorr is the first-order serial
correlation in taxable income; DITC is an indicator variable, equal to
1 if firms have positive investment tax credits, and 0 otherwise; DNOL
is an indicator variable, equal to 1 if there are any net operating
losses, and 0 otherwise; DSmallNeg is an indicator variable, equal to 1
if firms have small negative taxable income between −$500,000 and
$0, and 0 otherwise; and DSmallPos is an indicator variable, equal to 1
if firms have small positive taxable income between $0 and $500,000,
and 0 otherwise. We use annual data in Compustat until 2016 to
estimate TIVol and TICorr on the basis of a recursive algorithm
(Campello et al., 2011; Graham and Smith, 1999).
Compustat
Investmentt Annual capital expenditures plus R&D spending, scaled by the lagged
total assets (Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 2003; Bhandari and
Javakhadze, 2017).
Compustat
Qt The market value of equity, minus the book value of equity, plus the
book value of assets, divided by the book value of assets (Bhandari
and Javakhadze, 2017).
Compustat
Profitability Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization, scaled by
total assets (Campello et al., 2011).
Compustat
CF volatility The standard deviation of cash flows over 4 years (Campello et al.,
2011).
Compustat
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Table A1. (Continued)
Variable Definition Source
Z-score Z-score = 1.2 ×Workingcapital + 1.4 × Retained earnings+ 3.3 ×
EBIT + 0.999 × Sales)/Total assets (Campello et al., 2011).
Compustat
KZ-Indext KZ-Index = −1.002 × Cash flow+ 0.283 × Tobin′sQ+ 3.139 ×
Leverage− 39.368 ×Dividend− 1.315 × Cash holdings, where all
variables are normalized by total assets (Lamont, Polk and
Saaá-Requejo, 2001).
Compustat
SA-Indext SA-Index = −0.737 × FSize+ 0.043 × FSize2 − 0.040 × Age, where
FSize is the natural log of inflation adjusted (to 2004) book assets,
and Age is the number of years a firm has been on Compustat with a
non-missing stock price. The upper limit of FSize is ln($4.5 billion)
and the upper limit of Age is capped at 37 years (Hadlock and
Pierce, 2010).
Compustat
FDISt The standard deviation of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts in the
3-month period before fiscal year end (Chen and King, 2014).
I/B/E/S
ACCMt Moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals over the
prior 3 years, where discretionary accruals are estimated from the
modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995; Kim, Li
and Zhang, 2011).
Compustat
G-Indext Corporate governance index composed of 24 provisions on investor
rights and takeover protections (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003).
ISS
E-Indext Corporate governance index composed of the six most important
provisions in G-Index (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2009).
ISS
TMIt Ownership of institutional investors whose holding value in a firm
ranked as the top 10% of the stocks in their portfolios (Fich,
Harford and Tran, 2015).
s34 files
TBLCt Total ownership of blockholders who hold more than 5% of a firm’s




Amount of cash held above a predicted optimal level of cash reserves,





Cash-to-total assets ratio minus the median of the cash-to-total assets
ratios of firms with the same four-digit SIC codes (Haushalter,
Klasa and Maxwell, 2007).
Compustat
Negativet The count of the sentiment word list of negative in 10-K filings, scaled
by the count of all words appearing in the Loughran–McDonald
Master Dictionary (2018) (Lamont, Polk and Saaá-Requejo, 2001).
McDonald
Uncertaintyt The count of the sentiment word list of uncertainty in 10-K filings,
scaled by the count of all words appearing in the
Loughran–McDonald Master Dictionary (2018) (Lamont, Polk and
Saaá-Requejo, 2001).
McDonald
Litigioust The count of the sentiment word list of litigious in 10-K filings, scaled
by the count of all words appearing in the Loughran–McDonald
Master Dictionary (2018) (Lamont, Polk and Saaá-Requejo, 2001).
McDonald
Constrainingt The count of the sentiment word list of constraining in 10-K filings,
scaled by the count of all words appearing in the
Loughran–McDonald Master Dictionary (2018) (Lamont, Polk and
Saaá-Requejo, 2001).
McDonald
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